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Why Do Product-Market Strategies Fail?  
A Socio-Structural Examination under Conditions of Adherence 
 
Abstract 
We contend that structural and managerial antecedents of strategy failure exist and the extent to 
which these determine failure is different under conditions of high and low adherence to strategy. 
Our results support these arguments and demonstrate that the drivers of failure differ according to 
the unusual strategy process environment of both types of firms. Resource scarcity is found to be 
a common antecedent to strategy failure in organizations regardless of adherence. From there, 
managerial conditions (symbolic information use, strategy championing, and tenure) drive 
strategy failure in high adherence firms. But only structural conditions (formalization and 
resource scarcity) are antecedents of strategy failure in low adherence firms, while failure is 
mitigated by centralized decision-making.  
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Introduction & Background 
The strategic management literature is replete with studies offering models of high performance 
and avenues to success, yet despite recent treatises, research is relatively silent on the causes of 
failure (e.g., Finkelstein, 2003; Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004; Mellahi, 2005; Sheppard and 
Chowdhury, 2005). Scholars have made attempts to consider new product/project failures (Royer, 
2003; Biyalogorsky, Boulding, and Staelin, 2006) and organizational failure (Mellahi and 
Wilkinson, 2004; Mellahi, 2005; Sheppard and Chowdhury, 2005) but have rarely attempted to 
address the issue of strategy failure (e.g., Baumard and Starbuck, 2005). We define strategy 
failure as considerably substandard business performance relative to major, direct competitor 
referents. In other words, the strategy is not meeting the firm’s performance objectives and 
performance is far worse relative to competitors, and is thus a failing strategy. This view of 
strategy failure is consistent with other works in this domain (Baumard and Starbuck, 2005) and 
accepts that strategy failure does not necessarily mean the death of a company, but can be a 
critical factor in this happening (Finkelstein, 2003). The literature on organizational failure views 
this as the death of the organization (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988, 1992; D’Aveni, 1989; 
Finkelstein, 2003; Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004; Mellahi, 2005; Wilkinson and Mellahi, 2005) 
and many potential causes of organizational failure arise in the literature and include crisis 
(Schendel, Patton, and Riggs, 1976); strategic extremism (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988); 
resource deteriorations (D’Aveni, 1989); information processing deficiencies (Hambrick and 
D’Aveni, 1992; Finkelstein, 2003); management team composition (Mellahi, 2005); and learning 
deficiencies (Cannon and Edmondson, 2005). The accepted view in the failure literature is that 
organizational death is not instantaneous but rather occurs as a downward spiral or over time 
through stages before death occurs (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988, 1992; Finkelstein, 2003; 
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Sheppard and Chowdhury, 2005). We suggest that strategy failure does not necessarily mean the 
death of the company because strategy failure can be addressed and, ipso facto, would provide an 
opportunity for strategic change and turnaround. If strategy failure is not addressed then strategic 
paralysis could take hold and lead to organizational death by strategy failure (Whetten, 1980). In 
isolation then, strategy failure can be a cause in itself of organizational failure but strategy failure 
may not necessarily lead inevitably to absolute organizational failure. As Finkelstein (2003) 
noted, stupidity or dishonesty rarely causes organizational failure, but rather, multiple strategy 
failures and a failure to address the underlying problems that exist are the ultimate reasons for 
death occurring. 
 Examining factors involved in strategy failure is particularly difficult as circumstances 
that can lead towards success can lead to failure depending on context. Comprehensive planning, 
for example, can lead to higher performance (Powell, 1992) but in turbulent times can become a 
hindrance that causes inflexibility that reduces performance and lead to failure (Atuahene-Gima 
and Murray, 2004). Indeed, learning from repeated successes can make future strategy failures 
more likely (Baumard and Starbuck, 2005). As Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004: 34) indicated, any 
attempt to explain failure “will not be complete unless the interplay between contextual forces 
and organizational dynamics is taken into account”. Understanding how failure happens then 
requires consideration of the context in which it can occur. As yet however, such research is 
critically lacking in the strategy literature. 
Employing adherence theory we consider the context of strategy adherence, or persistence 
with current strategy, which is the antithesis to strategic fit theory. Strategic managers must 
understand their market environment, customer needs, value drivers, and competitors’ behavior 
and from this, formulate and implement the correct product-market strategy (Varadarajan and 
Jayachandran, 1999). Consequently, strategic managers invest much time and effort in this 
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strategy-making process to bring the product-market strategy to fruition (Menon, Bharadwaj, 
Adidam, and Edison, 1999). A key decision facing strategic managers is whether to persist or 
adhere with the current product-market strategy, or, change the direction of the organization and 
follow a new strategy (Lant, Milliken, and Batra, 1992). Indeed, Menon et al. (1999: 21) 
identified from interviews with managers that “staying the course” is an important aspect of 
successful strategy-making. This decision would appear, on the face of it, to be a relatively 
simple one to address: if the environment changes substantively enough then surely a new 
product-market strategy is best? After all, the organization will not be in ‘fit’ with its market 
environment and so requires a new strategy (Sheppard and Chowdhury, 2005) as advocated in 
strategic fit theory. In following traditional fit theory, firms would therefore always adapt strategy 
to fit their external environment and internal circumstances so that the most appropriate strategy 
is followed. This however is a misconception. Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal, and Hunt (1998) 
discovered that strategic changes are in fact uncharacteristic of firms even in the face of major 
environmental upheaval. Rather, firms will simply look to make minor first-order modifications 
to the product-market strategy rather than make more substantial strategic changes that radically 
alter strategy and strategic direction. These minor first-order changes in reality have no bearing 
on the current strategy or the strategic direction of the firm. Indeed, managers tend to react more 
positively to changes that would only modify strategy incrementally (Baumard and Starbuck, 
2005). Ultimately, the organizational conditions associated with high or low adherence firms may 
be similar, but, the effect of these contextual conditions on leading to success or failure can differ 
(e.g., Hughes and Morgan, 2007). 
 Our research goal is to address the question of how strategy failure occurs in 
organizations that are predisposed toward changing or persisting with current strategy. In 
addressing this we make several contributions. First, we identify managerial and structural 
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drivers of strategy failure and examine these in respect to high and low levels of adherence 
through multi-group structural equation modeling. In doing so, we contribute knowledge of 
critical antecedents of strategy failure that function under different firm conditions. As a preview, 
we reveal that high adherence organizations are most affected by managerial factors whilst low 
adherence organizations are primarily affected by structural elements. Thus, we dispel the belief 
that a common set of conditions drive failure in each type of firm. Second, we dispel the 
normative assumption that championing is invariably beneficial for organizations. Consequently, 
we contribute to that literature by confirming Royer’s (2003) contentions that championing can 
have negative implications for organizations by inducing inertia to move away from the 
championed strategy even when strategy is failing. Third, we demonstrate that low adherence 
firms, those more open to adaptation and change, may also suffer strategy failure from increased 
formalization and resource scarcity but this failure can be mitigated by increased centralized 
control. As such, we break up the adherence dynamic presented in the literature so far to 
demonstrate that low adherence in and of itself does not avert the risk of failure. These three 
contributions offer important managerial and theory-based implications which we discuss to 
close this work. 
Hypothesis Development 
‘Adherence’ has been described as ‘realizing’ the product-market strategy (Covin, Slevin, and 
Schultz, 1997) based on the belief that making constant changes to strategy ‘inhibits’ the actual 
adoption of the chosen strategy (Hughes and Morgan, 2007). We describe adherence as 
persistence with current strategy (Lant et al., 1992). Minor modifications to product-market 
strategy may be made over time but, as the adherence literature stresses, these adjustments are not 
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second-order strategic changes but are first-order modifications made over time, which do not 
result in changes in the prevailing strategic direction (Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998). 
 Adhering to the product-market strategy demonstrates confidence in that strategy  and can 
lead to efficiency gains (Lant et al., 1992), more effective deployment of strategic resources 
(Hughes and Morgan, 2007), generate performance benefits (Covin et al., 1997; Hughes and 
Morgan, 2007), and may have learning benefits for strategic managers insomuch that they can 
benefit from understanding more about the product-market strategy and its effects on markets and 
customers (Hughes and Morgan, 2007). Conversely, scholars also advocate flexibility in product-
market strategies as a means to enhance performance and competitive advantage (e.g., Grewal 
and Tansuhaj, 2001). Adhering to strategy in the face of changing market environments and 
customer demands can erode strategic fit and competitive advantage, therefore rendering the 
strategy inappropriate as it is not aligned with the market and customer demands. Consequently, 
strategic managers face a strategic paradox. On the one hand, strategy adherence can have 
notional benefits; on the other hand, it can lead to situations where failure can arise as it prevents 
deviance from current course of action. To capture this paradoxical situation, we examine two 
groups of organizations: the first group of firms is predisposed to adhere to current strategy and 
the second group of firms is predisposed to adhere less and is readily willing to adapt strategy. 
Our interest lies in the internal characteristics of these groups of organizations and in 
particular what conditions might drive strategy failure at different levels of adherence. In doing 
so, we overcome the assumption prevalent in adherence theory that such firms with high or low 
adherence share simply high or low levels of the same structural and managerial characteristics. It 
is apparent from adherence theory that internal circumstances are critical to the view of whether 
to adhere (high adherence) or change strategy (low adherence) (e.g., Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 
1998). Consequently, and given the suggestion of Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004) to focus on 
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organizational dynamics, it is prudent to advance this research into strategy failure by examining 
internal characteristics that can theoretically lead to strategy failure but are as yet unfounded 
empirically due to the lack of substantive research into strategy failure. We distinguish between 
‘structural characteristics’ and ‘managerial characteristics’ as drivers of strategy failure (Figure 
1). We suspect that high adherence firms will differ characteristically from low adherence firms 
as the internal conditions for such behavior to occur are likely to be different. For instance, low 
adherence implies the ability to be flexible and adaptive which is unlikely to be possible in highly 
formalized firms. However, high formalization of processes and procedures is likely to be useful 
for high adherence firms to stay the course and ensure the desired strategy is employed and not 
deviated from. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
Structural Characteristics 
We consider centralization, formalization, and resource scarcity as structural characteristics of 
organizations that can be influential in creating conditions for failure (e.g., Finkelstein, 2003). 
Together, these conditions can act against flexibility to change strategy despite being within the 
realm of management control (Covin et al., 1997; Finkelstein, 2003). Centralization relates to the 
concentration of decision-making authority at the highest levels of the firm, whilst formalization 
is the degree to which standardized rules and procedures dictate how strategic activities are to be 
performed (e.g., Vorhies and Morgan, 2003). Excessive centralization and formalization is 
associated with bureaucracy and mechanistic processes that can serve to slow down strategic 
decision-making, lower cross-functional integration, lower consensus in strategy-making, and 
compromise effective market information processing (Slevin and Covin, 1997; Menon et al., 
1999). Consequently, it is likely that these factors can lead to strategy failure. Indeed, excessive 
control brought about by autocratic management, centralization, and formalization were direct 
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causes in the failure of Wang Labs (Finkelstein, 2003). We suspect that the effect of 
centralization and formalization as structural variables will be stronger in low adherence firms 
however. Low adherence firms rely on flexibility and a capacity for adaptiveness. To do so 
successfully appears dependent on the structural conditions of the firm inasmuch as that 
adaptability would likely be constrained under conditions of high centralization and 
formalization. Organic structures characterized by decentralization and informalized rules and 
procedures tend to promote greater flexibility whilst inflexibility is true of the opposite (e.g., 
Slevin and Covin, 1997). Inflexibility is of less a concern in high adherence firms as strategy 
remains relatively consistent and unchanged over time. It would also be expected that high 
adherence firms may characteristically be centralized and formalized in order to maintain control 
and consistency over strategic direction and coordinate the activities of, what are often, complex 
organizations (e.g., Sull, 1999). As such, these conditions may not be prevalent in failure but are 
likely to be issues of concern in low adherence firms. Thus: 
Hypothesis 1. Centralization is negatively related to strategy failure in (a) high adherence 
firms but is positively related to strategy failure in (b) low adherence firms. 
Hypothesis 2. Formalization is negatively related to strategy failure in (a) high adherence 
firms but is positively related to strategy failure in (b) low adherence firms. 
 D'Aveni (1989) proposed that resources deteriorations are important causes of decline. 
Firms with unavailable resources at the time of the implementation effort would be more 
constrained in their ability to initiate appropriate actions (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988). The 
presence of slack resources, such as cash, stock, or access to credit can provide a firm with the 
cushion necessary to implement a strategy (Barker and Duhaime, 1997) and their absence could 
lead to adherence with disregard for strategic fit (Covin et al., 1997). Slack resources help firms 
absorb the effects of performance downturns and provide a basis to take effective actions. As 
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such, resources are likely a key issue in strategy failure as the resource-base can change over time 
after strategy has been implemented and then undermine the effectiveness of the strategy, thereby 
leading to failure. 
 Covin et al. (1997) posited that resource scarcity hinders strategic change and can cause 
adherence. A lack of resources is likely to stifle change and adaptation to changing market 
environments and customer demands and as a result, competitive advantages and performance 
will likely erode, perpetuating strategy failure. Whilst it is apparent that resource weaknesses 
would be potentially disastrous in many firms (West and DeCastro, 2001), we suspect the effect 
will be worse in high adherence firms. Resource scarcity in high adherence firms can generate 
myopia to current resources only as sources of strategic options. In effect, change is seen as a 
threat to this already weak resource base and as threats to the firm’s current position and current 
strategy. The result is defensive action to adhere to current paths as opposed to a fundamental 
rethink of how change can rejuvenate the organization. Organizations that are flexible ought to be 
more aware of customers and bases for value creation as part of their predisposition to tolerate 
uncertainty and accept variability as a part of the strategy process (e.g., Grewal and Tansuhaj, 
2001). Accordingly, low adherence firms seek to respond relatively quickly even when resources 
are limited. However, we propose that whilst low adherence firms are inherently more flexible, a 
capacity to be flexible requires slack resources (Grewal and Tansuhaj, 2001) and scarcity would 
undermine this and likely perpetuate strategy failure. 
 High adherence organizations tend to be more ‘stuck in their strategy’ and in times of 
significant market changes, would require plentiful resources to change. Low adherence firms are 
capable of adapting but resource limitations would still hamper attempts to pursue new strategy 
avenues when change undermines the current course of action. Thus: 
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Hypothesis 3. Resource scarcity is positively related to strategy failure in (a) high 
adherence firms and in (b) low adherence firms. 
Managerial Characteristics 
We examine symbolic information use, strategy championing, and tenure as managerial 
characteristics since research has associated these conditions with the perpetuation of historical 
strategy. Symbolic information use concerns information ‘misuse’ and Finkelstein (2003) 
stressed that situations where information is not relayed accurately or is deliberately misused can 
become significant causes of failure. Symbolic information use is the collection and use of 
information to justify instinct or previously taken decisions; and the distortion and manipulation 
of information to support, legitimize, and sustain the opinion or dispositions of a strategic 
decision-maker (Diamantopoulos and Souchon, 1999; Menon and Varadarajan, 1992; Vyas and 
Souchon, 2003). Biyalogorsky et al. (2006) found that escalating commitment to failing new 
products was caused by improper use of initial positive beliefs in the face of new negative 
information, a situation akin to symbolic information use. Symbolic use should lead to strategy 
failure as information misuse or manipulation can misleadingly deliver a strong strategic solution 
which ultimately is not appropriate to the product-market circumstances of the firm. This effect is 
likely to be stronger in high adherence firms that seek to hold fast to current plans and so lack the 
flexibility to subsequently move away from their inappropriate strategy. Symbolic information 
use can lead to the pushing of specific political agendas (Diamantopoulos and Souchon, 1999; 
Vyas and Souchon, 2003) which may involve pressure to maintain strategic direction when the 
decision to do so is wrong. Whilst this clearly could be opposite, such as an agenda to push 
through change, the effect on the firm is likely to be less stressful on performance as change is 
often required to happen if strategic fit is to be maintained (due to its dynamic nature) (Zajac, 
Kraatz, and Bresser, 2000). 
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 Low adherence firms are capable of moving quickly and adapting to environmental 
circumstances as they arise given their riskier nature and predisposition toward change (Covin et 
al., 1997). However, this also raises the possibility of symbolic information use pushing the 
organization toward inappropriate strategic directions or actions. It is easier for political 
influences or specific agendas to take hold when the organization is not rigid in its approach to 
strategy and is open to rapid changes in actions (e.g., Diamantopoulos and Souchon, 1999; Vyas 
and Souchon, 2003). Accordingly, we suspect that information misuse in this manner would also 
exacerbate the likelihood of failure in low adherence firms. Thus, we submit: 
Hypothesis 4. Symbolic information use is positively related to strategy failure in (a) high 
adherence firms and in (b) low adherence firms. 
 Championing has been shown in the new product literature to have several positive 
benefits relating to team performance, new product development, and success (e.g., Howell and 
Shea, 2001, 2006). However Royer (2003), through case study analysis, associated championing 
with adherence and the subsequent failure of companies on the basis that too much championing 
leads to situations where companies repel attempts to abandon failing projects or change 
strategies when change is a necessity. Because empirical evidence supporting this evidence is 
scarce however, this association has to be determined quantitatively. We hypothesize that 
strategy championing can set in motion a risk of strategy failure, in particular in less open and 
flexible organizations. Excessive championing will trap strategic managers into persisting during 
times of strategy failure and this will be amplified in high adherence situations as champions 
push and promote persistence with the current strategy agenda. As agents of strategic managers, 
champions can mobilize support for the initial strategy but in doing so become vectors for its 
persistence in spite of change in environmental conditions, effectively binding firms to the 
strategic status quo (Hambrick, Geletkanycz, and Fredrickson, 1993). Champions then are likely 
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to face psychological and peer-related costs in high adherence firms should they suddenly shift 
course to promote change when strategic managers maintain an adherence perspective. In low 
adherence firms, deviant behavior by champions to advocate change is more likely to be accepted 
by employees and strategic managers. Low adherence firms pursue the notion of strategic fit and 
understand the necessity to change strategy in the face of environmental upheaval. As such, we 
do not expect championing to lead to an increased risk of failure in this context. Thus: 
Hypothesis 5. Strategy championing is positively related to strategy failure in (a) high 
adherence firms but is negatively related to strategy failure in (b) low adherence firms. 
Long, or ‘high’, tenure is also likely to lead to failure as high tenured strategic managers 
may be too willing to look to past product-market strategies and practices for actions to employ 
in today’s markets (c.f. Hambrick et al., 1993). Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) theorized that the 
longer the length of time top managers are in their post, the more susceptible they become to 
limited and symbolic information use, manipulation of their power base, and rely on past strategy 
decisions to inform future actions. The result is a strategic manager who is unwilling to deviate 
from their historic decisions. It is on this basis that Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) put forward 
their ‘dysfunction’ thesis. Studies support the validity of this thesis. For example, Miller (1991) 
and Miller and Shamsie (2001) found that tenure causes dysfunction at around 8–10 years of 
tenure and firm performance declines in turn. The decline occurs because managers’ experiences 
and successes in post over time shape views of the world that are constrained around their 
preconceptions and past successful strategies. These conditions lead high-tenured managers to 
shape organization initiatives increasingly around their own biases (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 
2004). Their power base also becomes stronger as tenure increases, which risks problems of 
adherence (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991). Recent studies go further to suggest that performance 
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may decline in as little as 24 months of tenure depending on the degree of industry dynamism 
(Henderson, Miller, and Hambrick, 2006). 
With respect to adherence, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) demonstrated that longer 
tenured managers tend toward strategic persistence and a tendency then to resist changing 
strategy to maintain fit. In effect, tenure exacerbates a tendency to adhere to strategy and to act in 
narrowly conceived ways when adhering to strategy, irrespective of the performance of that 
strategy at that moment in time. Accordingly, strategies designed by such managers are likely to 
become increasingly inappropriate for dealing with today’s contemporary customers, 
competitors, and dynamic market environments; thereby becoming a cause of failure. 
The effect of tenure might be different in low adherence firms, however. In such firms, 
managers operate and perpetuate conditions of flexibility and change, which encourages 
oversight, reflection, and revision of firm strategy. Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) suggested that 
such conditions will counteract the expected disadvantages of tenure. Thus: 
Hypothesis 6. Tenure is positively related to strategy failure in (a) high adherence firms but 
is negatively related to strategy failure in (b) low adherence firms. 
Research Method 
Data were generated from a mail survey of medium-large organizations classified as high 
technology, industrial manufacturers. Firms were sampled at the strategic business unit level as 
product-market strategies are business-level strategies. A minimum threshold of 100 full-time 
employees was set to control for economies of scale and liability of smallness issues and due to 
their limited capacity for strategic analysis, tendency to rely on informal strategic design, and 
preoccupation with operational decision-making (e.g., Morgan and Strong, 2003). Firms 
operating for more than five years were sampled as younger firms can suffer from liabilities of 
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newness, which can put survival at risk and can lead to premature failure (Stinchombe, 1965; 
Sapienza, Autio, George, and Zahra, 2006). 
We sampled high technology firms owing to the fact they face environmental turbulence 
and market change more regularly than traditional firms in stable markets and therefore the issues 
of strategy failure, fit, and adherence are particularly relevant. Turbulent and hostile 
environments are unforgiving (Covin et al., 1997) and present two opposing but equally sensible 
positions for managers to take. Firstly, they could leave little to chance and carefully plan and 
adhere to their strategies to avoid being caught off guard and provide stability to the firm in 
unstable climates (Covin et al., 1997). Conversely, the need for strategic flexibility to deal with 
hostile environments suggests a need to not adhere to strategy so that the firm can best tackle its 
environmental situation and remain in strategic fit (e.g., Zajac et al., 2000). In benign conditions 
there may not be a need to deviate from strategies and the likelihood of failure in general should 
be, prima facie, lower and thus provide a poor context to study strategy failure. Following a 
systematic random sampling procedure using the Kompass Register, 1000 firms were sampled, 
each satisfying our high technology criteria. 
Preliminary interviews revealed that the most appropriate key informant in a position to 
have most knowledge regarding the product-market strategy and that could provide the most 
reliable information regarding the variables contained in the questionnaire was the Head of 
Marketing. This decision-maker was believed to have most: knowledge of the product-market 
strategy employed by the firm; insight into the creation of this strategy; and, would have greatest 
understanding of performance. The mean working experience of the respondents is 22 years and 
their mean tenure within their current organization is 10 years. This suggests that the respondents 
will have gained sufficient experience and knowledge of their positions and of product-market 
strategy. Further, informants are likely to be familiar and experienced with the strategic priorities 
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and routines of their respective organizations and thus, be similarly familiar with the strategic 
decision-making processes in their organizations. Analysis of respondents’ belief regarding their 
level of knowledge relating to the questions contained in the questionnaire was on average 5.62 
(S.D. = 1.014) and their confidence in the extent to which their responses accurately reflected the 
‘realities’ of involvement in product-market strategy decision-making was again on average 5.62 
(S.D. = .901). Overall, we can be confident that the key informant chosen was appropriate. 
 Survey administration consisted of pre-notification; mailing of a full questionnaire pack; 
first reminder letter; and, second reminder consisting of a full questionnaire pack. Recommended 
practice regarding cover letter, questionnaire salience and length, follow-ups, return postage, 
anonymity, lack of explicit deadlines, and university sponsorship were also applied to encourage 
the response rate. A total of 139 usable responses were obtained. Respondent analysis revealed 
the majority to be Heads of Marketing (50.35%). The remaining respondents were Specialist 
Directors (24.48%), Specialist Managers (16.78%), Senior Marketing Personnel (5.59%), or other 
executive personnel appointed at the strategic apex of the firm (2.8%). Respondent organizations 
had on average US$144 million sales turnover in the last 12 month period (standard deviation 
[SD] = US$410 million) and the average number of employees equaled 1215 (SD = 6280). These 
figures are entirely consistent with past research that examined SBUs of medium-large size. For 
instance, average firm size in terms of number of employees in the work of Barker and Duhaime 
(1997) was 1787 (SD = 3276). 
Non-response bias was examined using a variety of methods. First, the Armstrong and 
Overton (1977) extrapolation method of statistical comparison between groups of early and late 
respondents revealed no significant differences, at conventional levels, between the variables of 
interest in the study. Second, we contacted a random sample of 150 non-respondents after all 
mailings were complete and invited them to participate in the study or ascertain reasons for non-
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response. Of these, 13 companies chose to respond. Analysis of variance between those that did 
respond and those companies that initially were non-respondents found no significant statistical 
difference between these groups on all of the constructs in the model. Third, as we had access to 
objective data on our sampled companies we performed a respondent–non-respondent 
comparison on a random sample of fifty respondents and fifty non-respondents from our original 
sample. This examination of non-response bias was performed following the prescriptions of 
Morgan, Vorhies, and Mason (2009). We examined for significant differences between these 
companies on firm size, age and net profit. No significant differences were found between 
respondents and non-respondents. 
A number of steps were taken to eliminate the potential for common method bias arising 
from our single-respondent, self-report approach. We sought to minimize common method bias 
in developing the questionnaire by relying on objective data for firm size; placing the 
measurement scales in random order; implied no idealized response; shortened questionnaire 
length; and provided detailed instructions for its completion. We examined common method bias 
using the Harman one-factor test (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, Podsakoff, 2003). All variables 
were specified in a single factor confirmatory factor analysis: χ2 (d.f.) = 1492.05 (252); χ2/d.f. = 
5.92; root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .19; conditional fit index (CFI) = .59; 
incremental fit index (IFI) = .59; non-normed fit index (NNFI) = .55. The χ2/d.f ratio exceeds the 
≤ 2.00 cutoff (Bollen, 1989); the RMSEA exceeds the .08 level of acceptability (Hu and Bentler, 
1999); and the fit indices are far below any accepted threshold. The model fit statistics show 
significant problems with the single factor solution and so demand its rejection (Hu and Bentler, 
1999). Common method bias does not appear to be a threat in our data. 
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 All scales were drawn from measurement batteries used in previous studies. Symbolic 
information use was measured using items created by Diamantopoulos and Souchon (1999). 
Strategy championing and commitment were measured by employing items used by Noble and 
Mokwa (1999). Centralization and formalization were assessed through measures used by 
Vorhies and Morgan (2003). Resource scarcity was captured by utilizing reverse-coded resource 
commitment measures used by Menon et al. (1999). Tenure was assessed by asking the 
respondent to identify their length of tenure with their current organization. Adherence was 
assessed through measures developed by Covin et al. (1997). Conventional subjective measures 
were used to gauge performance over the past year, relative to major, direct competitor referents 
in meeting specific strategic goals on sales growth, return on investment, profitability, and overall 
firm performance. These items were reverse-coded to form strategy failure. This approach is 
consistent with the definition of strategy failure put forth earlier and reflects the difficulties in 
surveying firms specifically on strategy failure. For measure validation, all multi-item scales 
were entered simultaneously into a confirmatory factor analysis using the covariance matrix and 
the maximum likelihood estimation procedure (Table 1). The measurement model fit indexes 
indicate acceptable fit (χ2 [d.f.] = 292.47 [225]; RMSEA = .05; CFI = .97; IFI = .97; NNFI = 
.96). All composite reliabilities and average variances extracted were acceptable and within 
minimum thresholds (Table 2). 
Insert Table 1 here 
Insert Table 2 here 
Results 
Multi-group structural equation modeling (SEM) was employed to test the hypotheses using 
LISREL 8.54. We split the sample by the degree of adherence to form two groups, the first 
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consisting of high adherence firms (n = 93) and the second consisting of low adherence firms (n 
= 46). Two structural models were specified. The first model was a restricted model in which the 
γ parameters linking the structural and managerial characteristics to strategy failure for the low 
adherence group were fixed at zero, and the γ parameters for the high adherence group were 
freely estimated. The second model was an unrestricted model in which those γ parameters 
originally fixed at zero were freed. For the restricted model, the fit statistics were χ2 (d.f.) = 
511.26 (360); RMSEA = .08; CFI = .90; IFI = .90; NNFI = .89. For the unrestricted model, the fit 
statistics were χ2 (d.f.) = 487.84 (354); RMSEA = .07; CFI = .90; IFI = .90; NNFI = .89. Moving 
from the restricted model to the unrestricted model resulted in a decrease in χ2 of 23.42, with an 
associated decrease of 6 degrees of freedom. This change in χ2 is an improvement in fit 
significant at p ≤ .01. This data indicates that the unrestricted model is superior and it is therefore 
most appropriate to use the results of the unrestricted model in hypothesis testing. The squared 
multiple correlations for reduced form for failure show that 56% of variance in failure is 
explained by the explanatory variables in the model (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1996). The SEM 
results for the high and low adherence groups are displayed in Table 3. 
Insert Table 3 here 
 The results show marked differences between the two groups. For the high adherence 
group, centralization (H1a) and formalization (H2a) do not play a significant role with respect to 
failure. However, resource scarcity (H3a); symbolic information use (H4a); strategy championing 
(H5a); and, tenure (H6a) are shown to be significant drivers of strategy failure in high adherence 
organizations. For the low adherence group, symbolic information use, strategy championing, 
and tenure are not related to strategy failure but formalization (H2b) and resource scarcity (H3b) 
are positively related. In addition, centralization (H1b) exhibits a significant negative relationship 
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with failure, and therefore can mitigate the possibility of failure occurring in low adherence 
organizations. It would appear, then, that strategy failure in high adherence organizations is 
mostly a consequence of managerial factors (notwithstanding resource scarcity), whereas low 
adherence organizations are subject to being more strongly affected by structural factors. 
Additional Analysis 
We sought to examine the managerial and structural conditions that can lead to strategy failure. 
But the long-term implication of this for the organization is that multiple strategy failures over a 
prolonged period of time will likely lead to organizational failure. To research this potential 
further, we gathered objective data on failure as represented by the Quiscore. This score is a form 
of credit rating and reflects the risk of absolute organizational failure—death—where low 
Quiscores indicate imminent danger of organizational failure. As additional analysis, we consider 
the effects of our independent variables on this risk of absolute failure. Introducing this Quiscore 
of failure into the restricted and unrestricted SEM models show once again that the unrestricted 
model is superior (Δχ2 [d.f.] = 12.6 [6]; p ≤ .05). For the high adherence group, symbolic 
information use (t = 1.90; p ≤ .05) and championing (t = -2.27; p ≤ .05) are significant, indicating 
that whilst the misuse of information can bring down strategies it does not necessarily mean so 
for the company as a whole but championing again raises concerns. Results for the low adherence 
group indicate formalization (t = -1.28, p ≤ .10) and symbolic information use (t = -1.28; p ≤ .10) 
are significant causes of organizational failure and strategic managers must clearly be aware of 
these conditions when managing strategies given their effect on the survivability of their 
organizations. Whilst the results between strategy failure and absolute organizational failure, 
differ, it is apparent that variables that can cause strategies to fail can also lead to company 
failure and suggest a degree of robustness to our results. 
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Discussion and Implications 
As strategy failure often underlie, and are root causes of, organizational failure, we sought in this 
research study to examine the effect of structural and managerial factors on strategy failure to 
determine the extent to which these factors lead to strategy failure at high and low levels of 
adherence to the product-market strategy. In doing so, we contribute knowledge of conditions 
that exacerbate strategy failure in high and low adherence firms, and we demonstrate that both 
groups exhibit different antecedents to strategy failure. Our work is unusual in that we abandon 
the assumption that low adherence firms simply exhibit different levels of the same conditions as 
high adherence firms. In turn, our work offers much better understanding of how strategy failure 
arises in very different groups of organizations. Four contributions to the theory of adherence and 
its interrelationship with strategy failure result from our findings. 
 First, scholars often eschew opportunities to research strategy failures in favor of 
examining conditions for high performance. Consequently, the depth of knowledge on the drivers 
of strategy failure and its remedies are much less well known to strategic managers. We add to 
the body of literature on strategy failure and reveal important structural and managerial factors 
that drive strategy failure. Regardless of whether an organization strictly adheres to its strategy or 
adopts a more flexible approach, resource scarcity affects the capacity of firms to readily adapt 
and in both groups exacerbates strategy failure. But in terms of organizations that favor high 
adherence, the drivers of strategy failure are otherwise managerial, with symbolic information 
use, strategy championing and tenure all antecedents of strategy failure. In low adherence firms 
though, only the structural factors are antecedents to strategy failure, albeit centralization can 
mitigate and reduce the risk of failure as it exerts the opposite effect to our expectations. These 
insights contribute valuable knowledge to our understanding of failure in firms by demonstrating 
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that the drivers of failure vary by the nature of a firm’s strategic approach and does not follow the 
logic of a simple dichotomy. Accordingly, our contribution meets calls by Baumard and Starbuck 
(2005) among others for better understanding of strategy failure, the context of such failure, and 
its drivers. 
 Second, by breaking up the adherence dynamic present in firms, we can see how 
managerial and structural conditions exacerbate failure and impede management from readily 
diagnosing and implementing changes in strategy. Consequently, the findings suggest that 
strategic managers themselves are not solely to blame for strategy failure but that failure is a 
product of several intertwining conditions. Our findings then contribute to the literature on failure 
and caution us from readily apportioning blame to the behavior of strategic managers or resource 
weaknesses alone. Indeed, we contribute new findings to show how a blend of structural and 
managerial conditions can create strategy failure, thereby expanding considerably on findings by 
Khanna and Poulson (1995) that managers’ decisions are not solely to blame for organizational 
distress. Thus, we conclude, organizations must thoroughly analyze why strategies failed and 
why performance is degrading and not be quick to simply blame specific strategic managers or 
poor trading conditions. There may well be important underlying structural issues at play. 
 Our contribution suggests that the effect of resource scarcity on strategy failure might 
mask managers from readily understanding the interplay of factors affecting strategy failure. In 
turn, we contribute to the strategic management debate on structural and managerial 
constituencies that affect firm performance, create the conditions that perpetuate decline, and the 
inhibiting factors that support strategy failure as opposed to preventing it (Mellahi and 
Wilkinson, 2004). In terms of adherence theory, we show that it is not managers’ strict adherence 
to strategy or not that causes strategy failure, but rather the confluence of managerial and 
structural characteristics present in the firm. Although this is in part supportive of strategic fit 
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theory, the concept of a firm-environment-strategy match belies the interaction among different 
constituents in the firm to shape strategy failure. Bringing strategic fit theory together within that 
of adherence shows that the recipe for failure is empirically different. Thus, we reconcile these 
two lines of argument and add new insight into the mechanisms responsible for strategy failure in 
low adherence and high adherence situations, moving the focus from the strategic manager alone 
to more broader issues. In turn, we address calls by Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004) among others 
to understand the context and organizational dynamics underpinning strategy failure. 
 Third, two important conditions that might generate strategy failure according to theory 
are resource scarcity and symbolic information use. Covin et al. (1997) suggested that resource 
scarcity would lead to a propensity to adhere to current strategy, and consequently such 
adherence would cause failure. There is also some literature to associate resource weaknesses 
with problems of poor performance and our findings build on this body of research. Indeed, in 
both adherence groups, resource scarcity was a driver of strategy failure. The literature on 
symbolic information use also frequently suggests it has negative connotations for performance 
but very seldom do such studies go on to demonstrate this concern empirically (Diamantopoulos 
and Souchon, 1999; Vyas and Souchon, 2003). We empirically show this assertion is correct for 
strategy failure under conditions of high adherence. When organizations are more flexible this is 
not the case, perhaps because such firms rely less on information due to cost, but when symbolic 
information use is present, it can cause absolute organizational failure in low adherence firms. 
We therefore contribute empirical evidence to support the concerns raised about resource scarcity 
and symbolic information use by strategy scholars, but in doing so we distil in richer detail their 
effects on the firm. 
 A final important contribution relates to strategy championing. The normative assumption 
present in management literature is that championing is a positive trait for organizations. 
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However, Royer (2003) demonstrated that championing could have negative consequences at the 
project level. We quantitatively validate this concern at the strategic level. Championing is not 
inevitably beneficial and can lead to strategy failure in organizations that habitually persist with 
current strategies. Thus, we contribute new evidence that supports the growing discontent with 
championing as a ubiquitous high-performance trait. By linking championing to the theory of 
adherence, we show that championing can exacerbate the resistance to change that is 
symptomatic of strategy adherence. Thus, our contribution encourages greater reflection critical 
reflection on the positive and negative role championing can play in the strategy process. 
Implications for Managers 
Schendel et al. (1976) indicated that downturns were a result of unfavorable environmental shifts 
combined with inefficiency or inappropriate competitive strategies. We argued that strategy 
failure, as considerably substandard business performance relative to major, director competitor 
referents, over time and multiple strategy failures will lead to creating decline (be it rapid or 
otherwise) which ultimately leads to organizational failure (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1992; 
Finkelstein, 2003). We suggest that strategy failure can be addressed by managers before it is too 
late and organizational failure occurs. As Whetten (1980) indicated: by the time decline is 
complete, firms are often in a state of strategic paralysis and unable to change strategy 
sufficiently to save them from organizational death. In order to address strategy failure however, 
one needs an understanding of what can cause/mitigate it. 
It is apparent that high adherence organizations are likely to be more prone to failure on 
the basis that a greater number of conditions appear to drive strategy failure in these types of 
firms. Specifically, managerial characteristics have a significant influence on strategy failure 
along with resource scarcity. Structural concerns such as centralization and formalization should 
be of less concern to strategic managers when firms exhibit high adherence as these conditions 
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bear no influence on failure therein. Despite the fact that resource scarcity is perennial a problem 
for managers, our findings show that managerial considerations are just as important if not more 
so given that strategic managers have the power to ensure that the managerial climate is not one 
that is conducive to failure. Strategic managers must guard against abusing information and 
developing product-market strategies on the back of poor and misused information in particular. 
To this end, we suggest a climate of learning and information sharing be developed so that all 
organizational members are clear on the need to be focused on learning by developing shared 
understanding throughout the organization of all information gathered and knowledge created. 
Trust and a unified belief in the good of the organization are likely to be key factors in stifling 
information misuse. These same factors should also encourage reflection and the reevaluation of 
strategies to better manage the consequences of high strategy adherence. 
In low adherence firms, resource scarcity is again important but so are structural 
conditions. Managers must ensure the firm’s structural dimensions create rather than impede a 
capacity for flexibility. Low adherence firms are more flexible than high adherence firms, in 
theory, and maintaining this flexibility requires a degree of informality and freedom for 
organizational members in undertaking their work. Still while formalization does indeed drive 
strategy failure in these types of firms, we also show that some centralization can help to mitigate 
the risk of failure. Strategic managers should be mindful of this dynamic to ensure that a suitable 
organizational framework is in place to not only limit adherence but to encourage organizational 
members to learn to improve working practices as a pathway to avoid strategy failure. 
An overarching implication for both high and low adherence firms is the problem posed 
by resource scarcity. Caution must be taken against developing resource weaknesses (West and 
DeCastro, 2001), or overusing resources such that they become scarce in the organization, or 
allowing resources to diminish without sufficient investment in their renewal. Scarcity in the 
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firm’s resource base limits the ability of strategic managers to pursue new market opportunities 
and can blind strategic managers to orient their product-market strategies to avoid threats so as 
not to exacerbate the effects of resource limitations. Therein, resource scarcity becomes a key 
driver of failure. Managers must devote constant attention to the resource base of the firm so as to 
not let it diminish to the point that it creates a risk of strategy failure. Managers then should 
invest in a steady stream of resource acquisition initiatives, resource-based alliances, R&D, and 
resource bundling projects to minimize the risk of creating creeping weaknesses in the resource-
base of the firm. 
 Championing has long been associated with new product success in the new product 
development literature; however, in recent years its role in strategy has been questioned. Royer 
(2003) examined two cases of organizations suffering from failure and noted how champions 
were a negative influence on change in these organizations. We demonstrate empirically in this 
study that strategy championing can indeed generate strategy failure. Product-market strategies 
can be over-adhered through championing to beyond the point at which they are appropriate or 
the point at which strategic fit is eroded and the strategy becomes damaging. Strong championing 
can inhibit strategic change. Strategic managers must be mindful that when championing 
strategies, they do not build a climate that is hostile to change or is complacent change. Managers 
must ensure a capacity for flexibility exists so that the product-market strategy can be rapidly 
adapted as and when is necessary. 
 Lastly, strategic managers can become entrenched in their views and experiences and this 
has been associated with poor performance and a lack of adaptation. We demonstrate that tenure 
has a significant effect on strategy failure in organizations characterized by high adherence. It is 
apparent that long-tenured strategic managers must be willing to forgo the past and learn to 
continuously improve in order to stay ahead of competitors, employing contemporary as opposed 
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to past practices and strategic actions. Still, manager tenure does not appear to affect strategy 
failure in firms characterized by low adherence. Managers of low adherence firms appear to 
symbiotically share the same flexibility espoused by their firms. The appointment of strategic 
managers therefore seems a crucial component of the future adherence state of the organization, 
and the risk of strategy failure therein. 
Implications for Theory 
Adherence theory as advanced by several authors, most notably Lant et al. (1992), Covin et al. 
(1997), Fox-Wolfgramm et al. (1998), and Hughes and Morgan (2007) posits that managers and 
organizations typically persist or adhere to current strategies and strategic trajectories even in the 
face of environmental upheaval, rather than seek to make major strategic changes or change 
strategy to match/fit environmental conditions. Strategic fit theory clearly states that in 
circumstances of adherence to strategy, the strategy will likely fail because it does not best suit 
the environmental conditions in which the firm operates. To succeed, a new strategy should be 
developed to generate strategic fit. Proponents of adherence however contend that failure is not a 
given. In turbulent times, one clear strategy provides clarity of direction and makes use of what 
strategic resources and capabilities the organization has and as such is therefore the best strategy 
to continue with. If the environment is turbulent such that it is dynamic and continually changing 
then modifying strategy on a frequent basis creates uncertainty and flux which may disrupt the 
organization as well as hindering implementation efforts. Therefore, the current strategy should 
be adhered to (Covin et al., 1997). 
 Whilst there are merits to adherence (e.g., Hughes and Morgan, 2007) it is clear that 
situations arise where failure will occur due to it and change must occur before organizational 
failure occurs. This research enriches adherence theory with information on how adherence can 
become negative and why it occurs. We suggest that adherence theorists needs to recognize 
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strategic fit theory and develop a comprehensive understanding of the conditions in which 
adherence is appropriate and inappropriate beyond simple examinations of turbulent/benign 
environments as is the tendency in both literature streams. 
Study Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research 
Several limitations affect this study. First, we rely on a cross-sectional design. From this we 
cannot infer whether the identified relationships hold over time and suggest a longitudinal study 
is a necessary next step. Second, we employ a single informant approach. Although no common 
method problems were found, scholars have indicated that data generated from a multiple 
informant approach is preferred. Whilst generating data from a single informant is valid we do 
acknowledge this as a limitation of our work. This issue is mitigated by the use of objective data 
in the additional analyses which do bear some consistency with the original results and indicate 
that the use of subjective single-source data was robust. Third, gaining access into actual failing 
organizations is difficult as they are more inclined to focus on addressing their problems and 
implementing turnaround strategies than to admit serious problems and take part in surveys. We 
found this to be a significant issue in developing our sample and so relied on reverse coded items 
to assess strategy failure. Although we supplement our work with objective measures of the risk 
of absolute organizational failure, identifying and measuring failure in firms remains a difficult 
challenge for scholars. Fourth, we sampled high-technology organizations from the UK and 
caution against generalizing our results into industry contexts significantly beyond those 
described here. We appreciate that our research design choice in this respect does impose some 
limitations on the generalizability of our findings, but we feel that our multi-industry sample of 
high-technology firms is relevant and the findings are relevant to this important audience. 
Nonetheless, it would be useful to see data from other non-technology based industries (although 
such sample heterogeneity carries its own problems). Beyond this, future research could extend to 
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examine strategy failure in industries that are stable relative to unstable industries. Initial work by 
Covin et al (1997) in this area found that environmental hostility moderated the adherence–
performance relationship and adherence was positive in hostile situations. This work contradicts 
much of the planning literature however that tends to find that steadfast planning in turbulent 
environments damages performance. This would then indicate the need for further research. Fifth, 
we do not discuss young and small firms in our work. Recent literature on learning advantages of 
newness suggests that young firms may be able to defend against managerial and structural 
problems in meeting new opportunities owing to their lack of formal structure and lack of 
historical knowledge to bias organizational action (Sapienza et al., 2006). Nonetheless, age can 
undermine survival and lead to premature failure (Sapienza et al., 2006) and so our 
methodological choices are appropriate. But the study of failure in young firms is largely 
stagnant and over-reliant on age-related theories such as liabilities of newness. Thus, whilst our 
findings do not pertain to this class of firms, we do believe this is an interesting opportunity for 
future research. Sixth, our sample is limited to high-technology firms. While this is appropriate 
given the risks these firms face from regular environmental and market change, we cannot 
generalize to other more stable contexts and it would be useful to explore our framework in other 
industries. Taken together, these limitations signal possible avenues for future research. 
Several further opportunities for future research arise from this study. The role of 
championing requires immediate research. It is commonly taken for granted in the new product 
development and marketing literatures that championing has positive benefits with little negative 
implications. Our results confirm Royer’s (2003) assertions regarding the negative power of 
championing and call for further research to examine the conditions in which product-market 
strategy championing may prove negative to organizations. Understanding the context in which 
championing occurs and the situations that mitigate it from having harmful effects through 
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maintaining the strategic status quo will be beneficial to researchers and managers alike. Building 
on this, it may be that a market orientation or a climate for learning may moderate the 
relationship between championing and failure. By being market aware and willing to learn 
generatively as time passes, champions may develop a heightened awareness for market changes 
in customer needs, value, and competitor actions. As such, they may well then understand and 
champion the cause of strategy change as opposed to strategy adherence. Still, further research is 
certainly needed into this relationship as the results of Royer’s (2003) study suggested that such 
deviance may not occur due to the blindness caused by excessive championing. 
 More research is needed into strategy failure in flexible, low adherence firms. We 
recognize that there are many more structural and managerial characteristics that could be 
considered beyond those examined here. We suggest particular focus is given to flexible 
organizations, their mechanisms for learning, capability to adapt, and the conditions under which 
flexibility may be constrained such that failure could set in. 
 Despite recent studies, the body of literature on strategy failure is fragmented and in its 
infancy. Much more research is needed into the causes of strategy failure and how to remedy the 
situation before total failure becomes inevitable. We suggest that this is a crucial avenue for 
scholars to pursue. Further, given our problems in surveying failing companies a focus on a 
limited number of organizations through qualitative work may be useful to supplement 
widespread sampling. For the time being however, we feel our approach to modeling strategy 
failure is theoretically consistent and a prudent approach to breaching this important area of 
research. As the literature on strategy failure increases then opportunities to develop and test a 
broader model of strategy failure will become an important research issue. 
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Table 1 
Measurement Item Properties 
Construct Standardized 
Factor 
Loading 
t-value 
Centralization   
There can be little action taken in the organization until a superior makes a decision .82 —a 
A person who wants to make his or her own decisions would be quickly discouraged in the 
organization .73 9.18 
Even small matters have to be referred to someone with more authority for a final decision .84 11.03 
Any decision a person in the organization makes has to have his or her boss’s approval .82 10.73 
   
Formalization   
Most people in the organization follow written work rules for their job .49 —a 
How things are done in the organization is never left up to the person doing the work .79 4.09 
   
Resource Scarcity   
The right kinds of resources are allocated to the implementation efforts for this product-
market strategy .80 —a 
Adequate resources are allocated to the implementation efforts for this product-market 
strategy .92 12.23 
The resource structure is now well aligned with the product-market strategy requirements .87 11.57 
   
Symbolic information use   
Information is often collected to justify a strategic product-market decision already made .80 —a 
Information is used to justify strategic product-market decisions is often 
collected/interpreted after the decision has been made .72 7.72 
Information is often used to reinforce expectations .76 7.96 
   
Strategy Championing   
I felt that this product-market strategy lacked a true leader in the organization (r) .48 —a 
One person in the organization definitely took charge of making this product-market 
strategy happen .64 4.97 
The product-market strategy had a ‘champion’ to guide it through the implementation 
process .92 5.11 
   
Tenure   
Tenure with current organization .84 11.75 
   
Adherence   
My organization almost always adheres closely to its intended product-market strategy .70 —a 
Modifications to my organization’s intended product-market strategy are typically minimal .46 4.79 
In general, my organization is very effective at implementing chosen strategies .79 7.58 
My organization is almost always able to implement the strategies it would most like to 
employ .72 7.21 
   
Strategy Failure   
Sales growth .71 —a 
Return on investment .80 8.80 
Profitability .84 9.24 
‘Overall’ firm performance  .90 9.70 
a Item fixed to set the scale.  
(r) Item reverse-coded for analysis purposes. 
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Table 2 
Construct Robustness and Descriptive Statistics  
  CR AVE X1. X2. X3. X4. X5. X6. X7. X8. 
X1.  Centralization  .88 .65 .81a        
X2. Formalization .59 .43 .46** .66       
X3. Resource scarcity .90 .74 .36** .13 .86      
X4. Symbolic information use .81 .58 .09 .08 -.01 .76     
X5. Strategy championing .73 .49 -.35** -.29** -.52** -.11 .70    
X6. Tenure n/a n/a -.05 -.03 -.07 .03 .05 n/a   
X7. Adherence .77 .46 -.13 -.13 -.34** -.38** .31** -.06 .68  
X8. Strategy failure .89 .66 .11 .06 .28** .12 -.11 .12 -.10 .81 
            
Mean   3.13 2.75 3.76 4.05 4.78 10.59 4.54 3.02 
SD   1.32 1.21 1.30 1.20 1.16 8.99 1.04 1.05 
** p < .01. 
CR: Composite reliability. 
AVE: Average variance extracted. 
SD: Standard deviation. 
a Figures on the diagonal are square roots of AVE. 
n/a: Not applicable (single measure latent variable). 
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Table 3 
Multi-group SEM Results for High and Low Adherence Organizations 
 Independent  
variable 
 Dependent 
variable 
Standardized 
path estimate 
t-valuea 
High Adherence Organizations 
Hypothesis 1a. Centralization   Strategy failure -.12 -.67 
Hypothesis 2a. Formalization  Strategy failure .04 .22 
Hypothesis 3a. Resource scarcity  Strategy failure .53 3.49** 
Hypothesis 4a. Symbolic information use  Strategy failure .22 1.99* 
Hypothesis 5a. Strategy championing  Strategy failure .37 2.31* 
Hypothesis 6a. Tenure  Strategy failure .15 1.39† 
      
Low Adherence Organizations 
Hypothesis 1b. Centralization   Strategy failure -.53 -1.76* 
Hypothesis 2b. Formalization  Strategy failure 1.02 2.77** 
Hypothesis 3b. Resource scarcity  Strategy failure .44 1.85* 
Hypothesis 4b. Symbolic information use  Strategy failure .24 1.27 
Hypothesis 5b. Strategy championing  Strategy failure .14 .56 
Hypothesis 6b. Tenure  Strategy failure .20 1.05 
a Critical t-values: when ** p = .01, critical t-value = 2.326; when * p = .05, critical t-value = 1.645; when † p = .10, 
critical t-value = 1.282. 
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